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This paper analyzes the relationship between corruption, monitoring and production that exists in an
economy. We show that high levels of corruption can be connected to high levels of production and that
increased monitoring of corruption over some range negatively affects production. In point of fact, we prove
that equilibrium production is a non-linear function of the monitoring level, by presenting three different
equilibria: high corruption with intermediate production, no corruption but low production and no corruption
with high production. We also analyze an optimal strategy depending on the policy objective of the State.
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1. Introduction
In this work we construct a theoretical model to explain the relationship that exists between
corruption, monitoring and production in an economy. We produce an argument showing that
high level of corruption can be connected with high level of production and that increased
monitoring of corruption over some range negatively affect production. We use a two-sector
production model: to invest in the more efficient modern sector the entrepreneur has to apply for a
licence. The interaction is modelled as a multiple step game where the entrepreneur first decides
whether or not to incur the cost of applying; then the bureaucrat decides whether to give the
licence or ask for a bribe; if he asks for a bribe, negotiations determine the outcome. By solving
such a dynamic game within the principal–agent scheme, we derive a function that associates the⁎ Corresponding author. Universitá degli studi di Macerata, Dipartimento di Istituzioni Economiche e Finanziarie, via
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implemented by the State. Depending on the level of monitoring, the equilibrium is characterized
by either corruption and investment in the modern sector or no investment in the modern sector
and no corruption or investment in the modern sector but no corruption.
A variety of arguments since Leff (1964) have been put forward to counter his thesis that
corruption might be good for growth. In fact Leff views corruption as “grease money” to lubricate
the squeaky wheels of a rigid administration.
Others authors, like Barreto (2000), Del Monte and Papagni (2001), and Acemoglu and
Verdier (1998, 2000), studied models where corruption emerges from market failure and found
out that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is non-linear. To be more
precise, while Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000) determine the optimal corruption level in a
wage efficiency model—due to the presence of a trade-off between a public failure and a market
one—,1 Barreto (2000) showed that corruption can be “efficiency enhancing” since it reduces
bureaucratic inefficiency. Finally Del Monte and Papagni (2001) construct a model where
corruption reduces public infrastructure quality that is necessary for production and hence there is
a negative indirect impact on economic growth. We reach similar conclusions since we derive a
non-linear relationship between corruption and production. Differently from previous works, in
our model corruption is the consequence of three facts: firstly the low monitoring level
implemented by the State, secondly the existence of an entrepreneur return that could be used to
pay a bribe and, finally, the monopolistic and discretional power of a bureaucrat.
Differently from Barreto (2000), most economic researchers attach great importance to
corruption because of its significant negative impact on investment. For instance, Mauro (1995,
1998) showed that a country that improves its standing on corruption will experience an increase
in its investment and GDP growth rate. Furthermore, Campos et al. (1999) pointed out the
predictability of corruption by showing that the negative impact of corruption on investment is
lesser for those corrupt regimes that are predictable. Our conclusions are partially different from
the previous ones since we prove that with a low monitoring level, high corruption can lead to
greater production.
Modern analysis of corruption (starting from works by Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978) places
such a phenomenon within a principal–agent scheme. In fact, the existence of corruption is
subject to an agency relationship between an individual in charge of making decisions (the agent)
and the owner of the interests (principal) he represents. A third party (in this model the
entrepreneur) should then be involved to influence the agent's discretional decisions for this third
party's own benefit, upon the payment of a bribe. Following the assumption of most recent works
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) the agency relationship between the bureaucrat (agent) and the
Government (principal) will not be analyzed, but focus will only be placed on the possible
relationship between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur (third party) in order to better highlight
the mechanisms through which such relations develop, as well as the effects of such behavior on
the economy. In our model the State is an external agent which controls the bureaucratic and
entrepreneurial behavior by fixing the monitoring level.
Here we consider the model studied in Coppier and Piga (2004) while assuming the
entrepreneur can diversify production by investing in both the traditional as well as in the modern
sector of the economy. Furthermore, here we are assuming decreasing marginal returns to capital
in the production function. The approach we have used is mainly theoretical: we first formalize1 See also Besley and McLaren (1993) and Van Rijckeghem and Weber (1997) who proposed alternative bureaucr
payment schemes in the presence of corruption.at
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equilibrium production and finally we prove the properties of the monitoring–production (MP)
function and we discuss the optimal policy conclusions. The MP function is non-linear and upper-
hemicontinuous, furthermore, it is decreasing for low values of the monitoring level:2 it means
that, differently from Mauro (1998), more corruption could be associated with more production,
according to empirical evidence (the implication resulting from our model is also confirmed by
data for the Italian case from 1971–1996, see Coppier and Piga, 2004). In fact at low monitoring
levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption associated with greater production than
that in the case of intermediate monitoring level. Finally, only sufficiently high monitoring levels
guarantee maximum production without corruption. Consequently, since monitoring is costly, if
the State is budget constrained it may find it convenient to accept corruption and implement a low
monitoring level and obtain intermediate production levels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first present the model and then we
formalize and solve the dynamic game describing the model. In Section 3 we demonstrate the
non-linear relationship between the monitoring level of bureaucrats by the State and equilibrium
production, furthermore we describe the properties of such a relationship. In Section 4 we discuss
policy considerations and we compare different optimal policies related to the existence of a
budget constraint faced by the State. We conclude in Section 5.
2. The model
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good. There are two distinct
categories of individuals in such an economy. First the bureaucrats, who cannot invest in the
production activity, and second the entrepreneurs, who may invest their total capital available both
in the modern sector and in the traditional one.3 There is a continuum of bureaucrats and
entrepreneurs and their number is normalized to one for each category. A third agent is the State
which controls entrepreneurial and bureaucratic behavior in order to weed out or reduce
corruption.
The production function of the tradeable good only depends on the capital k>0 available to the
entrepreneur which could be invested in the modern sector or in the traditional one. Let kM and kT
be the capital amounts respectively invested in the modern or in the traditional sector (kM, kT≥0).
Then the output is obtained through technologies with decreasing marginal returns to capital,4 that
is
y ¼ kaM þ kbT ð1Þ
where kM+kT=k (all the capital amount is invested) and 0<β<α<1. We assume both that the
marginal returns to capital are decreasing, i.e. α, β∈ (0,1), and also that the returns in the
traditional sector are lower than those in the modern sector that is more profitable, i.e. β<α.52 While Coppier and Piga (2004) derived a discontinuous piecewise-constant function since they assume linear
technology.
3 As in Li et al. (2000) an agent can produce in either the traditional or the modern sector. The production in the
modern sector is greater than that in the traditional sector. The advantage of the traditional sector is that it is not subject to
expropriation, while that of the modern sector is. The reason is that entrepreneurs in the modern sector must obtain
permits, licences and are vulnerable to effects of corruption.
4 While Coppier and Piga (2004) considered the case of constant marginal returns to capital.
5 In our model, corrupt transactions are due to the existence of a non-competitive sector (the modern one) that
generates incomes for entrepreneurs used to pay the bribe.
625R. Coppier, E. Michetti / Economic Modelling 23 (2006) 622–637The entrepreneur who wants to invest a positive capital amount kM in the modern sector needs
to obtain a licence from the bureaucrat to access the technology. In order to obtain such a licence,
he has to submit a project to the Public Administration whose cost is a proportion s>0 of the
capital kM the entrepreneur wants to invest in the modern sector, then the submission cost is skM.
6
The presence of a fixed cost s>0 which the entrepreneur must pay before entering into
negotiations with the bureaucrat creates a hold-up problem. The hold-up problem applies when a
group of agents share some surplus from interaction and when an agent making an investment is
unable to receive all the benefits that accrue from that investment. This is due to the fact that the
investment of the entrepreneur is a sunk cost at the bargaining stage and will not be compensated
for by the bureaucrat.
We assume kM
α +kT
β − (kT+kM)β> skM in order to be worth investing in the modern sector.7
Once the entrepreneur presents the project to the bureaucrat, he may decide to be honest, or to
be corrupt by issuing the licence in exchange for a bribe.8 Let bd≥0 be the bribe asked for issue of
the licence, then the entrepreneur could refuse the payment of the bribe, agree to pay the bribe, or
open negotiations on the bribe with the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is assumed to have
monopolistic and discretional power, that is, he is the only one who may issue the licence or refuse
it without any explanation.
The State takes the role of controlling the behavior of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Let
q∈ [0,1] be the monitoring level implemented by the State such that there is a probability q of
being detected in extortion. In this paper we consider q as exogenous.
When detected in an act of corruption, the punishment is a proportional cost (monetary, moral
or criminal) of the submitted project capital amount kM both for entrepreneur and bureaucrat as in
Rose-Ackerman (1999). Let mkM be the punishment for the detected bureaucrat and ckM be that
for the detected entrepreneur, where m, c>0. We also assume m≥c since the bureaucrat has the
discretional power to demand the bribe and the monopolistic power to issue the licence.9
In the next section we determine the optimal level of the invested capital in each productivity
sector and consequently the production level of the economy where corruption exists. In order to
find out the relation between corruption, monitoring and production, we proceed then with the
formalization and solution of the dynamic game describing the model.
2.1. Dynamic game. Description and solution
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be formalized by the following
three-period dynamic game with perfect and complete information.
(1) At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur should decide in which sector to invest, i.e. he
decides the capital amount to be invested in the modern sector kM and consequently kT=k6 This hypothesis could be interpreted by regarding the modern sector as an innovative sector (e.g. telecommunic
tions) which still is in need of State regulation (via the project–licence mechanism). On the other hand, in line with wo
done by Kaufmann and Wei (1999), it could be argued that regulation levels are not exogenous in terms of corruptio
rather that the bureaucrat, having powers of discretion, has the power to impose licences and the sector where he has t
greater chance of extracting surplus from the entrepreneur by requesting bribes. The absence of the fixed cost s, does n
affect the non-linear result between the monitoring level and the output level.
7 If kM
α +kT
β − (kT+kM)β≤ skM then the submission cost exceeds the return gains between the two sectors.
8 Differently from Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in our model we assume that corruption is without theft.
9 As underlined in Rose-Ackerman (1999) in several countries bribe payers are treated more leniently than recipients
bribes.a-
rk
n,
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Public Administration, considering that a licence is needed to invest in the modern sector.
(1.1) If kM=0, all the capital is invested in the traditional sector. Let W>0 be the wage for the
bureaucrat, then the payoff vector for bureaucrat and entrepreneur is
p
P1
¼ ðW ; ðkT þ kMÞbÞ ð2Þ
being kT=k. The game ends.
(1.2) Otherwise, let kM≠0. Then the entrepreneur submits the project and pays the cost skM. The
game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two, the bureaucrat, facing an entrepreneur that has submitted a project to the
Public Administration, may decide not to ask for a bribe to issue the licence, or he may
negotiate the payment of a bribe bd with the entrepreneur to issue the licence. As the
bureaucrat has neutral risk, he will decide whether or not to ask for a bribe, evaluating his
expectations from payoffs.
(2.1) If bd =0 no bribe is asked, then the payoff vector for bureaucrat and entrepreneur is
p
P2
¼ ðW ; kaM þ kbT−skMÞ ð3Þ
being kM+kT=k, kM≠0. The game ends.
(2.2) Otherwise, let bd >0 be the positive bribe asked by the bureaucrat. The game continues to
stage three.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur should decide whether to negotiate the bribe to be paid to the
bureaucrat or to refuse to pay the bribe.
(3.1) If the entrepreneur does not negotiate the bribe, then the payoff vector is given by
p
P3
¼ ðW ; ðkT þ kMÞb−skMÞ ð4Þ
being kT+kM=k. Then the game ends.
(3.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts. Let bNB be the Nash solution to a bargaining game10 that is
the result of the negotiation. Then, given the monitoring level on corruption pursued by the
State q, the payoff vector is
p
P4
¼ ðW−qmkM þ ð1−qÞbNB; kaM þ kbT−ðsþ qcÞkM−ð1−qÞbNBÞ ð5Þ
being kT+kM=k, kM≠0. The game ends.
Such a game is represented as a tree in Fig. 1.
In the rest of the paper we refer to the bureaucrat payoff with a superscript (1) and to the
entrepreneur payoff with a superscript (2): they represent respectively the first and second element
of the payoff vector πi, i=1, 2, 3, 4, placed in Eqs. (2)–(5).
We first determine the equilibrium bribe bNB (see Appendix A for the proof).10 See Binmore et al. (1986).
stage one
the entrepreneur
the entrepreneur
stage two
the bureaucrat
stage three
no
submit the project
no
π1
π2
bd > 0 bd = 0 
negotiates the bribe negotiates the bribe
submit the project
π4
π3
Fig. 1. The tree game.
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Nash solution to a bargaining game in the last subgame, given by
bNB ¼ k
a
M þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb þ qðm−cÞkM
2ð1−qÞ : ð6Þ
Notice that the entrepreneur pays half of the expected surplus to the bureaucrat as a bribe.
Once determined the equilibrium bribe bNB in Eq. (6) then the payoff vector in Eq. (5) can be
expressed in the following way
p
P4
¼
 
W þ k
a
M þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM
2
;
kaM þ kbT þ ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM−2skM
2
!
:
ð7Þ
The dynamic game has been solved in Appendix B by using the backward induction method
starting from the last stage of the game, so we proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. Let
kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb
ðmþ cÞkM ¼ q1 < 1 and
kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−2skM
ðmþ cÞkM ¼ q2 > 0.
(a) If q∈ [0,q2] then the payoff vector is
p
P4
¼
 
W þ k
a
M þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM
2
;
kaM þ kbT þ ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM−2skM
2
!
;
(b) if q∈ (q2,q1) then the payoff vector is
p
P1
¼ ðW ; ðkT þ kMÞbÞ;
(c) if q∈ [q1,1] then the payoff vector is
p
P2
¼ ðW ; kaM þ kbT−skMÞ:11 If q=1 we are not at this stage of the game since there is no incentive for the bureaucrat to demand the bribe.
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obtain three perfect Nash equilibria in the subgames, depending on the parameter values, which
could be summarized as follows:12
• if q∈ [0,q2] then the entrepreneur submits the project at stage one, the bureaucrat asks for a
positive bribe at stage two, and finally, at stage three, the entrepreneur starts a negotiation
that ends at the equilibrium bribe bNB given by Eq. (6). The game ends and the payoff
vector is given by Eq. (7). This equilibrium is with the presence of corruption. In such a
case, the difference in profits between the modern sector and what is obtained from the
traditional sector is such as to make up for the expected cost of the entrepreneur's
corruption, of the bureaucrat's corruption and for the project submission cost. Thus, the
surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat will keep a negotiation
going, the outcome of which is the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining
game;
• if q∈ (q2,q1) then at stage one the entrepreneur does not submit the project. The game ends and
the payoff vector is given by Eq. (2). In such a case the entrepreneur knows that what he would
obtain from project submission is smaller than what he would obtain by investing in the
traditional sector and therefore he will not submit the project. Notice that the no investment
result for intermediary q follows from the sequential structure of the game, i.e. the firm incurs
the application cost before it negotiates the bribe and thus it is a sunk cost that does not enter
the negotiated surplus. As a consequence the bribe may turn out too large to justify the
investment. In such a case there is no corruption but all the entrepreneurs invest in the
traditional sector;
• if q∈ [q1,1] then the entrepreneur submits the project at stage one and the bureaucrat
does not ask for any positive bribe. The game ends and the payoff vector is given by
Eq. (3). In such case, once the entrepreneur has decided to submit the project to the
Public Administration, what the entrepreneur himself obtains in addition from the modern
sector compared to the traditional one is not enough to make up for the expected cost
for the entrepreneur and for the bureaucrat of being corrupted and detected, or for the
project implementation cost. With this in mind, the bureaucrat will not ask the
entrepreneur for a bribe. The entrepreneur, in turn, will find it worthwhile to submit the
project to the Public Administration, and will obtain the licence without paying any
bribe.
3. Equilibrium output
According to the solution of our dynamic game, we now consider the maximization problem
faced by the entrepreneur in order to determine the optimal capital level to be invested in the
modern sector and, hence, in the traditional one.
To simplify the analysis, in what follows we place k=1 and so we determine the capital shares
invested in both sectors. The following proposition states the optimal capital amount invested in
the modern sector (and also that invested in the traditional sector) corresponding to the three
regimes previously determined (see Appendix C for the proof).12 Notice that if s=0 then q1=q2 and so the equilibrium (b) stated in the previous proposition disappears.
0
q
1
g(q)
γ2
2γ2
0 qq2
kM*
k’M
q1 1
κ
1
κk’M
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) Solution of equations (i) and (iii); (b) qualitative graph of kM⁎ =ω(q).
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13
(a) If q∈ [0,q2] then a unique equilibrium capital amount invested in the modern sector kM⁎ =ϕ
(q) does exist such that ϕ(q) is continuous and ϕ′(q)<0.
(b) If q∈ (q2,q1) then the capital amount invested in the modern sector is kM=0 so kT=1.
(c) If q∈ [q1,1] then the capital amount invested in the modern sector is kM⁎∈ (0,1) so also
kT⁎∈ (0,1).
Notice that in the case of corruption (that is (a) in Proposition 3.1.) the capital amount invested
in the modern sector is a decreasing function of the monitoring level while in the other cases ((b)
and (c) in Proposition 3.1) it does not depend on the monitoring level.
Now we want to represent the qualitative graph of the equilibrium capital amount invested by
the entrepreneur in the modern sector, kM⁎ , with respect to the monitoring level implemented by
the State on corruption, q. Considering Proposition 3.1, we find the following function
kM* ¼ xðqÞ ¼
hðqÞ qa½0; q2
0 qaðq2; q1Þ
jað0; 1Þ qa½q1; 1
8<
: ð8Þ
ω(q) associates a unique equilibrium kM⁎∈ [0,1] to each q∈ [0,1].
In order to investigate the geometric properties of ω(q) we observe that such a function
represents the solution of the first order condition regarding the maximization problem on each of
the three pieces depending on the values of q (see Appendix C for the details).
To be more precise, let g(kM)=αkM
α−1−β(1−kM)β−1, γ1=q(m+c)+2s>0 and γ2=s>0. Then
the function kM
⁎ =ω(q) is the solution of the following equations:
(i) g(kM)=γ1 if q∈ [0,q2],
(ii) kM=0 if q∈ (q2,q1),
(iii) g(kM)=γ2 if q∈ [q1,1].13 If q2<0 or q1>1 then one of the previous equilibria disappears. We consider the most general case where the three
equilibria are all possible.
y(k’M)
q
y(κ)
0 q2 q1 1
y*
1
Fig. 3. The MP-function: equilibrium production level with respect to the monitoring of corruption.
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kM
⁎=ϕ(q). Furthermore, if q=0 then we have to solve g(kM)=2γ2; let kM′ be the solution of such an
equation. If q=q2 then π4=π1 so the solution of the maximization problem faced by the
entrepreneur is kM=0 as in (ii). Notice that ω(q) is continuous in q2. Furthermore ω(q) is constant
and equal to zero ∀q∈ (q2,q1) as stated in (ii). Finally if q∈ [q1,1] then the solution of equation in
(iii) is a constant value of kM, we call such a value κ, depending on s. Such equilibrium value is
positive as we have proven in Appendix C and κ>kM′ . It is straightforward to prove that function
ω(q) is upper-hemicontinuous. In Fig. 2, we present the solution in the form of a graph the
previous equations and the scheme of kM⁎ =ω(q).
Now we may discuss the qualitative properties held by the production equilibrium level with
respect to the monitoring implemented by the State on corruption as stated in the following
Proposition 3.2 proven in Appendix D.
Proposition 3.2. Let k=1 and assume 0<q2 and q1<1.
(a) If q∈ [0,q2] then a unique equilibrium production level y⁎=ψ(q) does exist such that
ψ(q)≥1 is continuous and ψ′(q)<0;
(b) if q∈ (q2,q1) then the equilibrium production level is y⁎=1;
(c) if q∈ [q1,1] then the equilibrium production level is y⁎=φ where φ>1.
Finally, the function that associates the unique equilibrium output to each monitoring level is
upper-hemicontinuous and it is given by the following function:
y* ¼ XðqÞ ¼
wðqÞ < u qa½0; q2
1 qaðq2; q1Þ
u > 1 qa½q1; 1
8<
: ð9Þ
We call such a function MP (monitoring–production). The scheme of the MP function is in Fig. 3.
4. Policy considerations
In this section, on the basis of what we have already demonstrated, we conduct a policy
analysis with a view of comparing possible equilibria in terms of well-being. The State could
631R. Coppier, E. Michetti / Economic Modelling 23 (2006) 622–637choose to achieve the following policy objectives: maximize production, weed out corruption or
minimize monitoring costs.
In order to take into account the level of well-being when designing or evaluating social
policies, one needs to use a social welfare function. Unfortunately, cases can occur in which one
public policy does not dominate the others, and vice versa as in our relatively general framework.
This means that there are some legitimate social welfare functions that would show that an
equilibrium results in higher welfare than in another equilibrium, and other legitimate social
welfare functions that would show exactly the opposite. When neither public policy dominates the
others, it is impossible to rank them, so that the policy maker cannot make a recommendation
which obeys the fairly general principles regarding the properties of social welfare. In technical
terms, this is to say that there is an incomplete ordering of alternative policies. In effect, well-
being will increase as income increases and as the levels of monitoring and corruption decrease.
Since an equilibrium which maximizes production with no corruption and monitoring does not
exist, the State must choose what, on the basis of its preferences, it considers best for society.
Taking these considerations into account, we analyze the following three cases:
• if the State wants to maximize production it has to set the monitoring level at q≥q1. Notice that
∀q≥q1 corruption is absent, hence, since monitoring is expensive, the optimal policy is to set
the monitoring level at q=q1 with consequent production level being y⁎=y(κ)=φ>1 (point
A=(q1,y(κ)) in Fig. 4 panel (a));
• if the State wants to weed out corruption it has to set a monitoring level q≥q2 so, without
corruption, two different equilibrium productions could be reached that are y⁎=1 and y⁎=y(κ)
>1, associated to different monitoring costs. In fact, if the State chooses production level y⁎=1,
then, since monitoring is expensive, it will establish a monitoring level q=q2. If, on the other
hand, the State chooses to aim for the higher level of production y⁎=y(κ), then, since
monitoring is expensive, it will establish a monitoring level q=q1. Therefore, depending on the
weight the policy maker places on the two objectives (production and monitoring cost), the
possible equilibria are B=(q2,1) and A=(q1,y(κ)) (see Fig. 4 panel (b));
• if the State wants to minimize monitoring costs it has to set the monitoring level at q=0 and the
equilibrium production that will be reached is y⁎=y(kM′ )∈ (1,y(κ)); such an objective is not
compatible with corruption elimination (point C=(0,y(kM′ )) in Fig. 4 panel (c)).
Note that, according to our considerations, a unique optimal policy, having the properties
“maximum production without corruption” does exist and that in order to achieve such an0 1
y*
1
qq2 q1 1 qq2 q1 1 qq2 q1
(a) (b) (c)
y(k’M) •
•
• •
A A
B
Cy(κ)
0
y*
1
y(k’M)
y(κ)
0
y*
1
y(k’M)
y(κ)
Fig. 4. The MP-function: equilibrium points according to different policy objectives.
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by fixing a monitoring level q=q1, the State can achieve such policy objectives at the same
time.
The equilibrium points just described (A, B and C in Fig. 4) are all viable, if and only if, the
State has sufficient resources at its disposal. However monitoring is expensive. Consequently
there could be different reasons why one or more of these three equilibria (A, B and C) could not
be viable. For example, if the State faces budget constraint or if it prefers to spend its resources on
pursuing different policy objectives.
Let q⁎ be the maximum monitoring level the State could or would implement according to its
budget constraint. We can consider the following three cases.
1) It is straightforward to see that if q⁎≥q1, all the equilibria illustrated in Fig. 4 are viable since
the constraint is not binding.
2) Differently, if q2≤q⁎<q1, we have the following cases:
• in order to maximize production, the monitoring level must be set at q=0 (point C): costs are
minimized but corruption cannot be avoided;
• in order to weed out corruption, the monitoring level must be set at q∈ [q2,q⁎] that implies
y⁎=1; since production is constant in the interval [q2,q⁎] and since monitoring is costly, then
the optimal policy is to fix q=q2 (point B);
• in order to minimize monitoring costs, the monitoring level must be set at q=0 (point C) and
the equilibrium production that will be achieved is y⁎=y(kM′ )∈ (1,y(κ)) with corruption.
The relevant result we obtain is that if the State is budget constrained (i.e. q2≤q≤q⁎) then the
equilibrium “maximum production without corruption” is not viable since the unique optimal
policy in order to maximize production is characterized by widespread corruption. This
argument shows that if the State is not interested in weeding out corruption, then the optimal
strategy is always q=0. Otherwise, if the policy objective is to avoid corruption, the optimal
strategy is always q=q2 that implies no investment in the modern sector with consequent
minimum production levels.
3) Finally, if q⁎<q2 then the State could not weed out corruption and consequently the optimal
policy is to set q=0 (point C in Fig. 4) since it minimizes monitoring costs and maximizes
production at the same time.
The policy objectives chosen by the State depend on the weight it assigns to each of the
three policy objectives we have described, based on its costs–benefits analysis. The model we
construct proves that, if the State is budget-constrained, the equilibrium with corruption could
be desirable as the result of an optimal policy since it maximizes production and minimizes
costs.14
5. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the relationship that exists between corruption, monitoring and
production in an economy where entrepreneurs can invest capital both in the traditional as well as
in the modern sector subject to licensing considering non-linear technology with decreasing
marginal returns.14 Similar conclusion in the case of asymmetry information are in Coppier and Piga (2004) where they considered the
effect of a particular reform.
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that equilibrium production is a non-linear upper-hemicontinuous function (MP function) of the
monitoring level implemented by the State on corruption by presenting three different equilibrium
scenarios. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption with
intermediate production levels, at intermediate monitoring levels corruption is absent but low
production levels are achieved, finally at high monitoring levels no corruption occurs and high
production levels are recorded.
According to the function we derived, we discussed the optimal monitoring level implemented
by the State in a normative perspective. By considering different policy objectives (maximizing
production, minimizing costs and weeding out corruption), we distinguished between different
optimal strategies depending on the existence of budget constraint faced by the State. In particular,
we proved that if the State faces budget constraint such that it cannot reach sufficient monitoring
levels, then the optimal policy could be to maximize production at minimum cost and accept
widespread corruption.
To sum up in our paper we assessed that, differently from previous works (see Mauro, 1995;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, among others), greater production could be associated with greater
corruption (a similar result is described in Barreto, 2000) according to empirical evidence for
several countries (for the Italian case see Coppier and Piga, 2004) and we proved that the
equilibrium point with widespread corruption can be chosen as the result of an optimal policy
implemented by the State.
Appendix A
A.1. Proof of proposition 2.1.
Proof. Let πΔ=π4−π3= (πΔ(1),πΔ(2)) be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between the case
of agreement about the bribe (5) and that in the case of disagreement (4) for the bureaucrat and the
entrepreneur. The bribe bNB associated to the Nash solution to a bargaining game is the solution of
the following maximum problem
max
baRþ

pð1ÞD d p
ð2Þ
D

in formula
max
baRþ
ð−qmkM þ ð1−qÞbÞðkaM−qckM−ð1−qÞbþ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞbÞ
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of πΔ. Since the objective function is
concave with respect to b, a sufficient condition for b being a maximum is the first order condition
Bðpð1ÞD d pð2ÞD Þ
Bb
¼ 0Z
ðkaM−qckM−ð1−qÞbþ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞbÞ−ð−qmkM þ ð1−qÞbÞ
¼ 0ZkaM þ qðm−cÞkM−2ð1−qÞbþ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb ¼ 0ZbNB
¼ k
a
M þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb þ qðm−cÞkM
2ð1−qÞ
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q≠1.
Since m−c≥0, then bNB>0. □
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B.1. Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Backward induction method.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if,
p
P
ð2Þ
4 > pP
ð2Þ
3 Zk
a
M þ kbT−skM−qckM−ð1−qÞbNB > ðkT þ kMÞb−skM
(See Eqs. (5) and (4)), that is the entrepreneur's payoff if he negotiates is greater than his
payoff if he refuses. Since, under perfect information hypothesis, the entrepreneur knows
the final equilibrium bribe bNB, given by Eq. (6), then we substitute this value in the
previous inequality and, by simplification, we obtain
kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM > 0
that is verified 8q < kaMþk
b
T−ðkTþkMÞb
ðmþcÞkM ¼ q1.
15
q1 has a meaning if and only if q1∈ [0,1]. Notice that q1>0 ∀kM, kT>0 since (kT
+kM)
β≤kMβ +kTβ <kMα +kTβ being α>β. Furthermore,
q1 < 1fk
a
M þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−ðmþ cÞkM < 0
so there exists a value of q such that it is not worth the entrepreneur's while to negotiate the
bribe. We assume q1<1 then if q<q1 the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe, otherwise if
q≥q1 he refuses the bribe.16
(2) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat decides whether to ask for a
positive bribe.
• Let q≥q1 then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneur will not accept any positive
bribe so he will be honest and will pursue the licence without any bribe.
• Let q<q1 then the bureaucrat knows that if he asks for a positive bribe then the
entrepreneur will start the negotiation and the final bribe will be bNB given by Eq. (6).
Then, at stage two the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if and only if
p
P
ð1Þ
4 > pP
ð1Þ
2 ZW−qmkM þ ð1−qÞbNB > W
(see Eqs. (5) and (3)) that is the bureaucrat's payoff if asking for a positive bribe is greater
than his payoff if he doesn't ask for the bribe. By substituting bNB given by Eq. (6) in the
previous inequality and simplifying the previous inequality, we obtain
kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM > 0
that holds ∀q<q1. So we can conclude that if q<q1 then the bureaucrat asks for the bribe
bNB that the entrepreneur accepts.
(1) At stage one the entrepreneur has to decide whether to present the project.
• Let q≥q1 then the entrepreneur knows that if he presents a project no bribe will be asked.15 Notice that kM must be different from 0. This condition is verified because we are studying stage three of the game so
the entrepreneur has already submitted the project to invest a positive capital amount in the modern sector.
16 Otherwise if q1≥1 then the entrepreneur always negotiates the bribe.
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p
P
ð2Þ
2 > pP
ð2Þ
1 Zk
a
M−skM þ kbT > ðkT þ kMÞb:
(see Eqs. (3) and (2)) that is if kM
α +kT
β − (kT+kM)β> skM. The previous inequality is always
verified by hypothesis.
• Let q<q1 then the entrepreneur knows that the bureaucrat will ask for the bribe b
NB that
he will accept. So, at stage one, he has to decide whether to invest a positive capital
amount in the modern sector. The entrepreneur will compare his payoff whether kM=0
with his payoff whether kM>0. He will invest no capital amount in the modern sector if
and only if
p
P
ð2Þ
1 > pP
ð2Þ
4 Z2ðkT þ kMÞbz−2skM þ kaM þ kbT þ ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM
(see Eqs. (2) and (5)) that is
−2skM þ kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkMV0
that is verified if and only if
qz
kaM þ kbT−ðkT þ kMÞb−2skM
ðmþ cÞkM ¼ q2:
Then if this inequality holds, the entrepreneur will invest all his capital in the
traditional sector. Otherwise, assume q2>0, then if q<q2 the entrepreneur will invest a
positive capital amount in the modern sector.17 It is straightforward to prove that
q2<q1. □
Appendix C
C.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof. First we prove part (a). If q∈ [0,q2] then the payoff vector is given by Eq. (7) as we have
proven in Proposition 2.2 so the optimal capital amount kM to be invested in the modern sector is
given by the solution of the following maximum problem faced by the entrepreneur
max
kMað0;1
kaM þ kbT þ ðkT þ kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM−2skM
2
subject to the restriction kT=1−kM. We substitute the boundary in the objective function and we
maximize
f ðkMÞ ¼ k
a
M þ ð1−kMÞb−qðmþ cÞkM−2skM
217 If q2≤0 the entrepreneur will never invest in the modern sector.
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f VðkMÞ ¼ ak
a−1
M −bð1−kMÞb−1−qðmþ cÞ−2s
2
¼ 0Zaka−1M −bð1−kMÞb−1 ¼ qðmþ cÞ þ 2s:
Let γ1=q(m+c)+2s>0 and g(kM)=αkM
α−1−β(1−kM)β−1. Then g(kM) is a continuous strictly
decreasing function such that limkMY0þ gðkMÞ ¼ þl while limkMY1− gðkMÞ ¼ −l so that
equation g(kM)=γ1 has a unique solution kM⁎ ∀γ1 such that kM⁎ is a decreasing function of q that is
kM* ¼ /ðqÞ and / VðqÞ < 0:
Furthermore kM⁎ is a maximum point because f is concave.
If q∈ (q2,q1) then the payoff vector is given by Eq. (2) and all the capital is invested in the
traditional sector so part (b) is proven.
To prove part (c) we have to solve the following maximum problem
max
kMað0;1
kaM þ kbT−skM
subject to the restriction
kT ¼ 1−kM:
Let h(kM)=kM
α +(1−kM)β− skM then the first order condition, that is also sufficient h being
concave, is given by
h VðkMÞ ¼ aka−1M −bð1−kMÞb−1−s ¼ 0Zaka−1M −bð1−kMÞb−1 ¼ s:
Let γ2= s>0 and g(kM)=αkM
α−1−β(1−kM)β−1 then following the same arguments we have used
to prove part (a) it is proven that a unique value kM⁎∈ (0,1) does exist such that the payoff for the
entrepreneur is maximum, ∀γ2, and it does not depend on q. □
Appendix D
D.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. We first consider the properties of the production function. Let us consider the production
function in Eq. (1) so being kM∈ [0,1], y(kM)=kMα +(1−kM)β is such that y(0)=y(1)=1 and y
(kM)>1, ∀kM∈ (0,1). Furthermore y′(kM)=αkMα−1−β(1−kM)β−1 =g(kM) (see Fig. 2 (a)) so that y
has a unique maximum point k¯M such that g(k¯M)=0. Now we consider the three different cases.
Case (1) Let q∈ [0,q2]. Then the equilibrium capital amount invested in the modern sector is kM⁎
such that g(kM⁎)=γ1 being γ1>0 so kM⁎ belongs to the increasing side of y(kM) ∀q∈ [0,
q2]. Furthermore kM⁎=ϕ(q) is a decreasing function of q then y(kM⁎)=y(ϕ(q)) is decreasing
∀q∈ [0,q2]. Notice that the equilibrium capital amount invested in the modern sector
without corruption, that is g(kM⁎)=0 is bigger that one in the case of corruption.
Case (2) Let q∈ (q2,q1). Then kM=0 and the production equilibrium level is y(0)=1.
Case (3) Let q∈ [q1,1]. Then the production equilibrium level isφ=y(κ) such thatφ>y(kM′ ) since
κ>kM′ and also g(κ)>0.
637R. Coppier, E. Michetti / Economic Modelling 23 (2006) 622–637Function y(q)=y(ψ(q)) is upper-hemicontinuous since it is the composition between a
continuous function and an upper-hemicontinuous function. □
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